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SAVING CLAUSE 
~ounsel has written and rewritten this petition six times. 
The strong language is intended solely to get the attention 
of the court. It is counsel's gamble that he might offend the 
court, weighed against the necessity of stating the matter so as 
to get that attention. 
Domestic law is in a state of evolution. Utah is not blind 
to this. The court's recent decision in Wilkins v. Stout was 
laudable. It opens the way to thoughtful consideration of out-
side assets, as the wife's inheritance, or the husband's vested 
retirement plan, that now stand as major and unresolved problems 
at the trial level. 
Counsel has already used that opinion three times at the 
trial level, and it has been most helpful to the judges. 
In the case at bar, the two issues raised are issues where 
counsel and courts sorely need guidance. 
Most domestic cases, even on appeal, involve who gets the 
table and who gets the cloth. 
This case, though, has not one, but two, issues whose 
thoughtful resolution can be of inestimable benefit. For that 
reason, counsel casts the dice and makes his gamble. 
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APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appellant, through her attorney, Samuel King, respectful!; 
requests the court to grant rehearing. 
When an attorney takes the time to submit a thoughtful 
brief to the court, he should be reasonably able to expect that 
the court will render a thoughtful opinion. 
The opinion in this case reads as if the opening page of 
I 
the brief, Statement of Points, was considered, these points on, 
their face held not worthy of further consideration, and the ca; 
cursorily scanned and dismissed. 
In fact, the case contains two very important issues. The' 
court has not touched on these. In other words, with all due 
respect to the court, it has missed the boat. 
Probably the court is wearied of certain types of appeals, 
such as writs for habeaus corpus from the Utah State Prison, or 
domestic appeals which are merely perpetuated bickering of the ' 
spouses. 
Last year in Salt Lake County, over 4, 000 domestic action: 
were filed. These cases involve an average of two children. 
Accordingly, in Salt Lake County alone, 16,000 persons were in· 
volved in the traunaand economic disaster of divorce in one year 
7hat is an epidemic. 
Because the judges in the state's populous areas are so 
swamped with work, they often render poor divorce decrees. Thi: 
is no reflection on the judge. It is that he doesn't have the 
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time to master the entire fact situation. Often, the judge's 
emotional and physical exhaustion enters as a human factor. 
It was to this very epidemic nature of domestic litigation 
that the two important points in appellant's brief were addressed. 
The first point was the issue of when abatement is appro-
priate. 
This case is a good example of why domestic judicial dis-
cretion should follow the criteria applied by Utah in other civil 
cases, but never clarified in domestic cases, which holds that 
a case should proceed in the state which is "best suited" to 
hear the entire case. (See Brief P29; Annex 2, P6) 
The result here, by denial of Mrs. Rest's motion for abate-
ment, was that she was required to go to court to try CHILD 
CUSTODY ON THREE COURT DAYS' NOTICE FROM THE TIME THE ISSUE OF 
CUSTODY WAS RAISED, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT NEITHER SHE 
NOR THE PARTIES' CHILDREN HAD EVER RESIDED IN THE STATE OF UTAH, 
THAT SHE WAS KNOWN TO BE ENTIRELY WITHOUT FUNDS WITH WHICH TO 
TRAVEL ACROSS COUNTRY TO APPEAR AND DEFEND, AND THAT ALL WIT-
NESSES WHO KNEW HER AND THE CHILDREN, AND EVEN THOSE WHO KNEW 
THE HUSBAND IN HIS SETTING AS FAMILY MAN, RESIDED IN DIFFERENT 
STATES, NOT ONE RESIDING IN THE STATE OF UTAH. (Caps to draw 
attention) 
These facts are spelled out in detail in Mrs. Rost's Brief 
on Appeal in the Statement of Facts at pages 6-9, in Point II at 
pages 28-32, and in Annex 2 (Her Interlocutory Appeal) at pages 
1-12. 
-2-
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Mrs. Rost prays the court review these portions of her 
Brief before proceeding with this petition. 
In its opinion, the Utah Supreme Court stated simply that 
abatement was not a matter of right, the state of first filing 
having the power to proceed. Had it had one sentence in it con-
cerning the facts, it is doubtful if the point would have been 
dismissed in such horn book fashion. 
The fact of the Utah trial court ',s power to deny abatement 
was not in issue. Of course, it had the power. 
I 
The issue was, what criteria should the trial court use in' 
ruling on such a motion? What discussion of this issue is there 
in the appellate opinion? 
Following that, her prayer for relief was that she be free( 
to proceed to enforce the decree, if such should be necessary, 
in New York. This prayer is overlooked in the appellate opinion. 
It was stated in the section on Relief Sought on Appeal (Brief · 
page 1) and in her Summary (Brief page 32) , factually explained 
at pages 9-10 of her brief and argued in Point II, pages 28-29. 
Our society is transitory. This generality applies with 
great frequency in domestic cases. Following the break-up ofa 
marriage, it is common for one spouse to leave the state of resi· 
dence as part of the process of leaving the home, going home to 
mother, seeking greener pastures, or simply escaping. 
Accordingly, the issue of sound criteria for abatement, or 
declining jurisdiction, is one that can be raised at trial 
hundreds of times each year. It is a proper issue. Most decis1: 
-3-
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will turn on what best serves the children. 
The present Utah law and some other states is almost FIFO. 
First one to the courthouse wins. 
This case is a classic example. 
Had Major Rost honored his sworn Separation Agreement, Mrs. 
Rost would not have contested the divorce. It was his unilateral 
rescision, with no announced cause, that compelled her to file 
in New York to try to hold him to the agreement. 
How the case came on for trial setting so rapidly is dif fi-
cult to determine particularly when Major Rost had (1) filed no 
reply to Mrs. Rest's answer and counterclaim; (2) the plea in 
abatement had not been heard; and (3) he had not asked for custody 
in his original complaint. 
When Judge Hyde heard the case, he commented that the prior 
judge had been attempting to "push the matter to early hearing." 
There is conflict in the law as to which state has the 
primary decree, based on whether first filing is the criteria or 
first decree is the criteria. 
It seems that Judge Wahlquist's purpose in "pushing" the 
case was to prevent Mrs. Rost from having time to obtain a "first" 
decree in New York. 
This kind of race to be first has nothing to do with justice. 
To the contrary, it means that the courts will act so quickly and 
implusively that they will rule without considering merits. 
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Judge Wahlquist is an experienced judge, but human. He 
had met the Major twice, and the ~1ajor is a fine looking, arti-
culate man of military bearing. He had not met Mrs. Rost. 
Clearly, the judge thought that he was not going to send 
that dedicated soldier cross country to fight a divorce on 
foreign turf. But by dealing with the known,the Major, in 
preference to the unknown, the wife and children, he forced 
them to that which he wouldn't make the Major do. This, though 
all witnesses relative to custody were also in ~ew York. 
To nail it down, the judge exceeded his authority. He 
terminated Mrs. Rost' s support as of the trial date which he 
set the next week, three court days away. This forced Mrs. 
Rost to (1) trial in Utah or (2) starve. That relief had not 
been asked. He did it sua sponte. 
What a help it would have been for her counsel if he couk 
have argued, as Judge Wahlquist is a student of the law, "Your 
honor, the Utah Supreme Court has set criteria for abatement. 
Let's compare them to the situation here." 
Doubtless the judge would have followed the law. It was 
the lack of such law that freed him to go unhindered by anythint 
but his visceral reaction, i.e., discretion. 
Mrs. Rost prays the court consider, and rule on, domestic 
criteria for abatement, and in process of that, free her to pre· 
ceed in New York should it ever be necessary. 
-5-
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Turning now to the second major issue, which the Utah 
supreme Court also overlooked, which is whether the Separation 
Agreement terms concerning property should not have been honored 
by the Utah court. 
The opinion states, "There is no claim that the award of 
alimony and support for the minor children is inequitable or that 
the court abused its discretion in making the award. It is only 
asserted that the court should have followed the agreement made 
by the parties." 
Pages 11 through 15 of Mrs. Rest's brief on appeal are a 
precise accounting in which Mrs. Rost showed that the Separation 
Agreement terms were equitable, and that Judge Hyde erred in 
not following them, so that his ruling was not equitable. 
The essence of what happened is that Major Rost had reduced 
his total indebtedness (even though he had bought all new furni-
ture on credit) from the time of the Separation Agreement to the 
time of trial, so he could actually live with the agreement. 
What he did though was run up extreme "short term" debt, by 
using credit to pay his regular expenses, rather than using cash. 
His many credit charges were substantial. 
Accordingly, he showed himself at the moment of trial, in 
a position of being cash short because he showed a substantial 
monthly cost of living, together with a great deal of short term 
indebtedness, both of which he had to meet each month. 
-6-
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Consider the ingeniousness of that. If I charge everyth_ 
for a month or two or, without design, I habitually always spet 
my income before I receive it, relying on the time lapse before 
my credit charges reach me, I can duplicate my expenditures. 
That is, I have my monthly cost of living, then I also have my 
short term indebtedness. However, they both cover the same gro 
the monthly cost of living. 
Facts supporting this argument were further spelled out 1 
the Statement of Facts within Mrs. Rest's Point I. 
She did not claim 9n appeal that the court should have h1 
ed the Settlement Agreement with such words being in a vacuum. 
She said it, and proved it, because the Settlement Agreement 
terms were fair, so that revising them was unfair. 
Judge Hyde made no findings of change of circumstance si 
the Separation Agreement had been made. He just found thatMa 
Rost' s then total monthly expenses were so high that he would 
have trouble meeting them and also paying the amount required 
the Settlement Agreement. In doing that though, Judge Hyde (a 
it must be remembered that the case started in late afternoon 
and finished that evening on the day before Thanksgiving becat 
of its rush to trial), didn't have the time to segregate and 
realize how and why Major Rost' s total monthly expenses had bi 
inflated, such inflating having nothing to do with his actual 
monthly need for money on a long term, regular basis. That i 
if he had paid his short term debt on the schedule he listed, 
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he would speedily have retired it and then had that money as 
pocket cash. 
Included within this factual issue was the larger issue of 
law and policy stated in detail at Point I of Mrs. Rost's Brief. 
The appellate opinion conceives this issue to be whether 
New York law had to be applied in a Utah divorce trial. It 
naturally said "no." 
Unfortunately, Mrs. Rost never claimed that. It was not an 
issue. If a pun may be allowed, such is not the case. 
The issue was the weight to be given prelitigation settle-
ment agreements. 
In the ordinary commercial case, if the contract says the 
law of a particular state is to be used, such will be followed 
by the trial court. However, this rule is incompatible with the 
overriding duty of a domestic judge to do equity--he can't be 
blindly bound. It would seem such provision should be considered 
carefully and the foreign law reviewed, but followed only if con-
sistent with equitable principles. 
Mrs. Rost avoided that issue because of its complexity. 
Instead, she based her point on much stronger ground. This is 
the legal standing of a settlement agreement itself. 
In most states of the union, prelitigation settlement agree-
ments are strongly encouraged. They are the vehicles by which 
parties considering divorce can give the marriage one more try. 
While husband and wife are in that comparatively thoughtful stage 
of attempting to reconcile, but realistically recognizing that 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
their problems may not be solveable, they can work out a settlE. 
ment agreement, i.e., "Okay, while we're trying to be nice to 
each other, this is a good time to settle terms if we can't max, 
it. It 
If they live the agreement out, and if either of the par-
ties relies in good faith on that agreement, what weight should 
it be given in the courts? That was the issue presented on app: 
At the present time in the Utah courts, from counsel's pe: 
sonal exl?erience with several thousand cases, settlement agree-
ments are worth the paper they are written on. The Utah Supren: 
Court has announced some criteria such as "great weight." It 
has made some comments about contractual obligation, but it alw1 
comes back to the unfettered discretion of the trial judge. 
Compared to this, New York has announced specific criteria 
Is there a finding of fraud or duress; is there specific evidenc 
of gross overreaching at the time the settlement agreement was 
made; was either party ignorant as to the agreement's terms; ha·, 
the parties lived with the agreement for a substantial time; wL 
the party who relied be injured if the agreement is revoked? !' 
not, the sworn contract is to be honored. 
Applying specific criteria will save judge time because fa 
fewer cases will be tried, and with this save attorney fees whic 
divorcing parties can rarely afford, and tremendous amounts of 
emotional trauma. 
New York law as cited because it is in harmony with other 
states, and also the legal criteria the parties agreed to. 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This does not tie the hands of the courts. If the specific 
criteria to set the agreement aside are not present at the time 
of trial, the courts can still, if there is a specific finding of 
changed circumstance, modify the terms of those agreements as 
under 30-3-5, UCA. 
There was no adverse change here for Major Rost as his total 
indebtedness had decreased and his income increased. Mrs. Rest's 
position was unchanged except that travel and suit costs put her 
in debt. 
The gap in the Utah law is that the trial judge has no dis-
tinction made by existing Utah law between later change of cir-
cumstance, and simply his feeling that in hindsight, the agreement 
should be changed. 
It also has no distinction between settlements hammered out 
in the heat of litigation and those carefully drawn before liti-
gation commences. 
There are many truisms about 20-20 hindsight, all true. 
Worse, we are tempted to use it. The New York concept of judicial 
restraint has something to commend it. 
It is because of this undefined judicial discretion that 
separation agreements are entirely unreliable in Utah. 
Because they are unreliable here, Utah law encourages liti-
gation to avoid them. This not only ties up the courts, it 
teaches people not to trust contracts, nor to trust the courts 
which interpret them. Are these results desirable? 
-10-
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Let us apply these theoretical arguments to actual situa: 
A typical case might be a wife who by nagging and whinb: 
makes the husband entirely responsible for her happiness ("Its 
your fault I'm not happy, John. 11 ) , yet no matter how valiant~: 
efforts, she never lets him succeed. She is happy really beca~ 
everything is her way,but he feels himself to be a miserable 
failure, a man who is not able to gain the love or respect of 
his wife. 
As an alternate example, the husband tells the wife that 
he has provided her with children and a good home, so she is i:.· 
debted to him. ("Most women would be grateful for what I give 
you, Marsha, so don't tell me what to do.") He then spends ail 
of his free time and money with a golf club or girl friend in 
hand. The neglected wife is in despair. 
In the marriage counselor's term, the "dynamics 11 of the 
relationships are out of balance, so that one party's needs are 
being fulfilled at the sacrifice of the others. 
Both example marriages give the children a picture of wh: 
marriage is based upon what they see at home. This view of a 
flawed reality creates poor odds that these children in their '.J 
will have good marriages. 
The unhappy spouse sees an attorney in a mood where theY 
, · f th· · remair can t survive as an effective person or parent i ings · 
as they are, but desperately wishing to improve their marriage 
rather than destroy it. 
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-At least half of counsel's divorce cases involve people 
forced to divorce, rather than wanting it. 
As matters now stand, the attorney refers them to a repu-
table counselor or their clergyman and cro.sses his fingers. They 
usually return in due time to obtain the divorce. Sometimes they 
remain in the unhappy marriage with nothing improved, setting a 
tense, unhappy, atmosphere for the children to grow in. 
Alternatively
1
, suppose the attorney draws a settlement agree-
ment, using as his tool to bring the dominant spouse in, that this 
is the only alternative to divorce. 
The economics of a settlement agreement are pretty much 
self declarative. A sharing of assets and income timed to meet 
the needs of the children first and the parties second, and an 
allocation of debts based on ability to pay. 
In this objective, professional -setting, the parties see 
two things that they often don't see in the smoke of the conflict 
at home. 
One thing is financial, and the other personal. 
The financial aspect is that the divorce per se greatly in-
creases the cost of living. Duplications will occur in housing, 
telephone, electricity, water and gas. Tax advantages of joint 
returns will be lost. The wife, no longer being an "insured" in 
health policy terms has to get a separate policy. Babysitters 
might be required if she has to work. Furnishings, linens, and 
all kitchen equipment must be duplicated. Car insurance goes 
-12-
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onto separate policies at higher rates than as a package, etc. 
If the husband has a take-home of $2,000.00 a month, 
$1,500.00 of it meeting family needs, and $500.00 being unbudg: 
he now sees that half of his income goes to the family and ha!' 
to himself. However, out of his half he has to pay the duplk 
expenses and the outstanding debt. He can make it, and for the 
welfare of his family will have to make it, but suddenly his 
financial freedom is gone. 
The wife, on her part, has to run the house and raise th: 
family on $1,000.00 instead of $1,500.00. With today's presen: 
home interest rates and food costs, the ordinary family wi~ 
children needs that sum just for the basics of food, housing, 
and utilities. Where is the money to run the car, buy clo~es 
or take tlE kids to Lagoon? She too will have to cut back seve: 
The personal thing that they see, especially the spouse•" 
has the upper hand, is that they will lose all the emotional ac 
vantages and status that their home and marriage offer. Oncec 
of that relationship, where are the volunteers to serve their 
emotional demands as the other spouse has done? 
The wife will be a "divorcee." The husband goes home to 
empty apartment. They frequently remarry just to avoid thesec 
sequences. The study done by the recent Family Court committe: 
showed a shocking 75% of remarriages end in divorce in Utah. '" 
bad to worse for the spouses and kids. 
Counseling is not too effective unless both parties have 
powerful motivation for change. 
-13-
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bottle until he is motivated. 
Now the counselor can do his work. 
The dominated spouses will have to look at the weakness of 
their pattern by which they slid from a healthy effort to make 
the other spouse happy to appeasing at a sacrifice of self. The 
dominating spouse will have to look at their contribution to a 
marriage that has become superficial and one-sided, rather than 
an intimate relation based on trust and sharing, which latter they 
make impossible by their self indulgent life styles. 
This realistic appraisal of what a person's needs really 
are, and how they might be met within a marriage, is often re-
warding. The "dynamics" can change. They frequently do. 
Also, frequently the dynamics don't change. If so, the 
divorce is proper. In that event at least, the divorce can be 
easy because the terms are already set. 
Professional counseling is used in the examples. Many 
people adjust for the better without it,provided the motivation 
is present of either changing their ways or divorcing. Clergy-
men are often effective. Also effective is a person just look-
ing at the cold reality of his options, like the smoker who can 
never kick the habit until the doctor tells him he is a candidate 
for a stroke. 
There is a lot of hypothetical in the above that the reader 
might question. There is also a lot of reality. 
-14-
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If the divorce is filed before the foregoing steps, by'. 
very act, damage is done, the parties polarize to protect the,. 
economic ends, and many marriages go into contested li tigatio:, 
What happens is that the "thinking" time is replaced by 
"litigation" time. The cart is before the horse, the parties 
suing first, and thinking second which is often an irreversibl' 
mistake. 
Miracles can't be worked. There is no guaranteed solutt 
for unhappy marriages. 
The gravamen is odds. Assume 10% of divorces might be a:1 
ed by motivated parties. (Counsel's own experience puts it higi., 
with at least one marriage out of three being improved to the :1 
where both parties wish to stay married.) Assume another 10% 
can avoid domestic court contest by use of the settlement agm 
ment (the variability of this figure depends on the weight give 
these agreements by the trial courts and, dependant on that, t: 
frequency with which they are used as an alternative to filing 
divorce). 
Now, apply these percentages, or whatever percentages the 
reader chooses, to the 4, O O O divorce cases in Salt Lake County· 
1978, to determine what any beneficial percentages mean in tet:' 
of saving judge time, or in terms of saving marriages. Go ahea 
Use your own figures and calculate the numbers, particularly if 
you go statewide for 10 years. 
The benefits, it is submitted, justify a judicial policY 
favoring prelitigation settlement agreements. Such a policy,: 
-15-
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words only, will be futile because, as words only it already 
exists and is futile. Counsel says it is futile because he has 
tried a number of cases with ante-nuptial or prelitigation agree-
ments and, as here, not one agreement has stood up. 
The judicial policy must be implemented by strong, clear, 
criteria announced by our state's highest court. These criteria 
beneficially combine the concepts of the sanct:i.W of marriage and 
the sanctiey of contract. Such criteria must supercede the pre-
sent unlimited judicial discretion, replacing it with criteria 
that are more reliable and precise, such as those which have proved 
successful in our sister states such as New York. 
Appellant respectfully requests that the court reconsider 
her brief, its opinion, and direct oral argument if it feels it 
appropriate. 




Mailed two copies of the foregoing Appellant's Petition 
for Rehearing to Pete N. Vlahos, attorney for plaintiff/respondent, 
2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, postage prepaid, United 
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